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95 
A CONSTITUTION THAT STARVES, BEATS, AND LASHES (OR 
THE PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE): JENNINGS V. RODRIGUEZ 
AND A PEEK INTO IMMIGRATION DISSENT HISTORY  
“[T]HE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT AUTHORIZE ARBITRARY 
DETENTION. AND THE REASON THAT IS SO IS SIMPLE: 
FREEDOM FROM ARBITRARY DETENTION IS AS ANCIENT 
AND IMPORTANT A RIGHT AS ANY FOUND WITHIN THE 
CONSTITUTION’S BOUNDARIES.”1  
On February 27, 2018, the Supreme Court handed down Jennings v. 
Rodriguez, a 5–3 decision2 met with panic,3 followed by reassurance,4 
and ultimately a steadfast determination that a constitutional battle over 
liberty itself rages on.5 That Jennings could elicit such a passionate re-
sponse is unsurprising, given the subject it takes up. Jennings is a class-
action lawsuit challenging federal laws that seemingly permit indefinite 
civil detention without a bail hearing while noncitizens fight to stay in 
the United States.6 Although some of the media response implied that 
Jennings was the last word upholding indefinite detention,7 the decision 
itself concluded only that the laws under review unambiguously allow 
for prolonged detention without a required bond hearing.8 Jennings did 
not address whether the Constitution permits such laws.9 Justice Alito, 
writing for the majority, concluded that the Ninth Circuit relied improp-
erly on the canon of constitutional avoidance to read a required periodic 
bond hearing into certain immigration laws.10 The Ninth Circuit now has 
  
 1. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 863 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 2. Justice Kagan recused herself. 
 3. Michael Kagan, Jennings v. Rodriguez Might Not Be About Immigration After All, 36 
YALE J. REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Mar. 2, 2018), http://yalejreg.com/nc/jennings-v-rodriguez-
might-not-be-about-immigration-after-all/ (“There has been much alarmism from immigrant rights 
advocates about the Supreme Court’s decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez.”). 
 4. Id.  
 5. SCOTUS Jennings Decision Won’t Be the Last Word on Bond Hearings for Immigrants, 
AM. IMMIGR. L. ASS’N (Feb. 27, 2018), http://www.aila.org/advo-media/press-releases/2018/scotus-
jennings-decision-wont-be-the-last-word (“Notwithstanding today's decision, the battle against 
prolonged detention without a hearing wages on.") 
 6. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 836, 838–39 (2018). 
 7. Amy R. Grenier, The Supreme Court Punts on the Constitutional Right to a Bond Hearing 
for Detained Immigrants, MIGRATIONIST (Mar. 6, 2018), https://themigrationist.net/2018/03/06/the-
supreme-court-punts-on-the-right-to-a-bond-hearing-for-detained-immigrants (describing the media 
portrayal as “technically accurate, yet deceptive”). 
 8. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 847–48. As the Court explains, one of the statutes at issue does 
allow release for witness-protection purposes, but otherwise the statute does not require a periodic 
bond hearing to assess whether an individual is a flight risk or poses a danger and thus merits release 
on bond. 
 9. Id. at 851. 
 10. Id. 
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a chance to decide whether the Constitution tolerates such laws, unless, 
as the Court implied it should, it finds it lacks jurisdiction.11  
Writing with impassioned opposition to the majority, Justice Brey-
er, joined by Justice Ginsburg and Justice Sotomayor, dissented.12 Justice 
Breyer would apply the avoidance doctrine to allow the three classes of 
migrants certified in the lawsuit to receive a bond hearing every six 
months.13 Under the avoidance doctrine, a court interpreting a statute that 
raises grave doubts about its constitutionality will interpret the statute to 
avoid the constitutional problem where feasible.14 The majority found 
that the statutes clearly enable prolonged detention without a bond hear-
ing, arguing that the Ninth Circuit’s use of constitutional avoidance 
amounted to a legislative rewrite rather than a judicial interpretation.15 
Justice Breyer disagreed, devoting nine pages of a formidable dissent 
explaining why the statutes as interpreted by the majority are likely un-
constitutional,16 and another eight pages supporting his argument for a 
constitutional reading of those statutes.17  
In so doing, he touched upon themes that have disturbed other dis-
senting justices since the federal government first established its stunning 
authority over immigration in the late nineteenth century. For instance, 
while not going so far as to argue that detention and deportation are a 
form of punishment that would require providing noncitizens with the 
same panoply of constitutional protections afforded criminal defendants, 
Justice Breyer draws on the criminal context, urging that civil confine-
ment for immigration purposes is “in every relevant sense identical” to 
pretrial criminal confinement: “the constitutional language, purposes, 
and tradition that require bail in instances of criminal confinement also 
very likely require bail in these instances of civil confinement.”18 Fur-
ther, he challenged the Government’s suggestion that we need not con-
cern ourselves with due process for “arriving aliens” because the law 
pretends that such noncitizens are not within U.S. territory.19 For Justice 
  
 11. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 851 (2018). 
 12. Id. at 859. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380–81, 385 (2005); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 190 
(1991) (quoting Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (“[A]s between two possible interpre-
tations of a statute, by one of which it would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain 
duty is to adopt that which will save the Act.”); United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 
(1916) (“A statute must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it 
is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that score.”). 
 15. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 836 (“[A] court relying on [the canon of avoidance] still must 
interpret the statute, not rewrite it.”).   
 16. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 861–69 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 17. Id. at 869–76. 
 18. Id. at 865. 
 19. Id. at 862. 
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Breyer, “indulg[ing] in [this] ‘legal fiction’” means nothing more than 
“shutting our eyes to the truth.”20 He asks: 
Whatever the fiction, would the Constitution leave the Government 
free to starve, beat, or lash those held within our boundaries? If not, 
then whatever the fiction, how can the Constitution authorize the 
Government to imprison arbitrarily those who, whatever we might 
pretend, are in reality right here in the United States? The answer is 
that the Constitution does not authorize arbitrary detention. And the 
reason that is so is simple: Freedom from arbitrary detention is as an-
cient and important a right as any found within the Constitution's 
boundaries.21  
With these powerful words, Justice Breyer joins a legacy of Su-
preme Court justices whose protests of major immigration decisions have 
rung in the ears of immigration law students since Congress first de-
clared its power to exclude, incarcerate, and banish noncitizens.22  
With commentators on Jennings noting Justice Breyer’s “scathing 
dissent,”23 immigration law students might take this opportunity to re-
  
 20. Id. 
 21. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 862–63 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also 
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 226–27 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting) 
(“Because the respondent has no right of entry, does it follow that he has no rights at all? Does the 
power to exclude mean that exclusion may be continued or effectuated by any means which happen 
to seem appropriate to the authorities? It would effectuate his exclusion to eject him bodily into the 
sea or to set him adrift in a rowboat. Would not such measures be condemned judicially as a depriva-
tion of life without due process of law?”). 
 22. See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 541 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The Court's 
holding that the Constitution permits the Government to lock up a lawful permanent resident of this 
country when there is concededly no reason to do so forgets over a century of precedent acknowl-
edging the rights of permanent residents, including the basic liberty from physical confinement lying 
at the heart of due process.”); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 772 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing) (“Thought control is not within the competence of any branch of government.”); id. at 785 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Nothing is served-least of all our standing in the international communi-
ty-by Mandel's exclusion. In blocking his admission, the Government has departed from the basic 
traditions of our country, its fearless acceptance of free discussion. By now deferring to the Execu-
tive, this Court departs from its own best role as the guardian of individual liberty in the face of 
governmental overreaching.”); 
Mezei, 345 U.S. at 224 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“Severe substantive laws can be endured if they are 
fairly and impartially applied.”); id. at 217 (Black, J., dissenting) (“No society is free where govern-
ment makes one person's liberty depend upon the arbitrary will of another.”); Harisiades v. Shaugh-
nessy, 342 U.S. 580, 600 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Banishment is punishment in the practi-
cal sense. It may deprive a man and his family of all that makes life worth while.”); United States ex 
rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 551 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“The plea that evi-
dence of guilt must be secret is abhorrent to free men, because it provides a cloak for the malevolent, 
the misinformed, the meddlesome, and the corrupt to play the role of informer undetected and uncor-
rected.”); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 738 (1893) (Brewer, J., dissenting) (“I 
deny that there is any arbitrary and unrestrained power to banish residents, even resident aliens.”); 
id. at 749 (Field, J., dissenting) (“If aliens had no rights under the constitution, they might not only 
be banished, but even capitally punished, without a jury, or the other incidents to a fair trial.”); id. at 
762 (Fuller, J., dissenting) (“The right to remain in the United States, in the enjoyment of all the 
rights, privileges, immunities, and exemptions accorded to the citizens and subjects of the most 
favored nation, is a valuable right, and certainly a right which cannot be taken away without taking 
away the liberty of its possessor. This cannot be done by mere legislation.”). 
 23. Grenier, supra note 7. 
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member the dissents of immigration past to see how, if at all, the debate 
has shifted over the past 130 years. In some respects, not much has 
changed. The specter of immigration law’s notorious plenary power doc-
trine still looms large. What has changed, of course, is the context in 
which these dissenters were writing. Since Chief Justice Fuller, writing 
in 1893, told us that plenary power over the deportation of resident 
noncitizens “contains within it the germs of the assertion of an unlimited 
and arbitrary power . . . incompatible with the immutable principles of 
justice,”24 the United States government has created a massive deporta-
tion and detention regime.25 Notably, some of the justices who would 
provide the most constitutional protections for noncitizens were writing 
at a time when deportation and detention were rare practices.26 Now that 
many of us unthinkingly accept deportation and detention as inevitable,27 
we seem to have narrowed the debate, asking more limited questions 
about what protections noncitizens deserve.28 By remembering what ar-
guments some of our nation’s greatest legal minds once thought feasible, 
we can begin to reframe what might be possible today. We can thus look 
into the past to imagine a different future.   
THE PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE 
Underlying much of the debate between dissenters and majority 
writers over the years is immigration law’s much-criticized plenary pow-
er doctrine, which has historically allowed the legislative and executive 
branches to exercise significant control over immigration with minimal 
intrusion from the judiciary. In 1889, the Supreme Court upheld Con-
gress’ explicitly racist Chinese Exclusion Act, the federal government’s 
first major attempt to exclude noncitizens from U.S. borders.29 The Court 
found that the power to exclude migrants was inherent in sovereignty (as 
  
 24. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 763. 
 25. See CÉSAR CUAUHTÉMOC GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, CRIMMIGRATION LAW 7–8 (2015); 
Jennifer M. Chacón, Overcriminalizing Immigration, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 613, 631–33 
(2012); Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42, 44–45 
(2010); see also Aliens Removed or Returned: Fiscal Years 1892 to 2016, DEP’T HOMELAND 
SECURITY (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2016/table39 
(providing removal data from 1892 to 2016) (hereinafter Aliens Removed); see also DORIS 
MEISSNER ET AL., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: THE RISE OF A 
FORMIDABLE MACHINERY 16–17 (2013) (documenting growth in spending on immigration en-
forcement). 
 26. See infra Conclusion. 
 27. See generally César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Naturalizing Immigration Imprison-
ment, 103 CAL. L. REV. 1449, 1513 (2015) [hereinafter Naturalizing Immigration Imprisonment]. 
 28. There are, of course, notable exceptions to the general trend toward accepting deportation 
and detention as inevitable.  See, e.g., Molly Walsh, Yes, ICE Deserves to Be Abolished, WASH. 
POST (Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2018/03/13/of-
course-democrats-should-want-to-abolish-ice/?utm_term=.da785a005c08; Sean McElwee, It’s Time 
to Abolish ICE, NATION (Mar. 9, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/its-time-to-abolish-ice; 
César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Abolishing Immigration Prisons, 97 B.U. L. REV. 245, 246 
(2017). 
 29. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889).   
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opposed to enumerated in the Constitution)30 and held by the political 
branches of government, whose “determination is conclusive upon the 
judiciary.”31 Although the Court has since allowed some judicial review 
of the constitutionality of immigration laws and their execution,32 the 
plenary power doctrine remains a prominent feature of immigration law 
that leaves some wondering just how much protection the Constitution 
provides noncitizens. Indeed, the Court has famously declared that 
“whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as 
far as an alien denied entry is concerned.”33 
Although the extent to which the political branches retain plenary 
power over immigration today remains a lively question,34 the Govern-
ment’s Jennings briefs relied heavily on this doctrine.35 That doctrine 
also lurked beneath Justice Breyer’s dissent insofar as he argued both 
that the judiciary has a role to play in assessing the constitutionality of 
immigration laws36 and that arriving noncitizens deserve constitutional 
protections.37 Justice Breyer’s dissent, then, continues a history of dis-
sents pushing back on the political branches’ immense power over immi-
gration laws. As discussed below, that history began at the end of the 
nineteenth century.   
BREYER IN 2018 OR BREWER IN 1893? 
Among the greatest dissents of immigration law are the three fiery 
protests that accompanied the Court’s 1893 decision in Fong Yue Ting v. 
United States.38 In Fong Yue Ting, the Court upheld a law allowing ex-
ecutive officers to arrest, detain, and deport Chinese residents without 
trial or judicial review when those noncitizens were unable to produce a 
certificate of residency available only upon the testimony of one credible 
  
 30. The Constitution contains a Naturalization Clause but no clause enabling exclusion or 
expulsion of noncitizens. 
 31. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606.   
 32. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 794–95 (1977) (asking whether there was a facially 
legitimate and bona fide reason for execution of immigration law). 
 33. U.S. ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950); see also Mathews v. Diaz, 
426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976) (“Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to 
citizens.”).  
 34. See, e.g., Michael Kagan, Plenary Power Is Dead! Long Live Plenary Power!. 114 MICH. 
L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 21, 22–23 (2015). 
 35. For example, the Government’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari opens its statement of the 
applicable law with a robust recitation of the plenary power doctrine: “This Court has ‘long recog-
nized [that] the power to expel or exclude aliens [is] a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by 
the Government's political departments largely immune from judicial control.’ Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 863 (2018) (No. 15-1204) (citing Fiallo, 430 U.S. 
at 792) (quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953)). 
 36. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 859 (2018) (Breyer J., dissenting). 
 37. Id. at 862–63; see also Brief of Professors of Constitutional, Immigration, and Adminis-
trative Law as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Jennings, 138 S. Ct. 830 (No. 15-1204) 
(explaining that the Government’s conclusion that arriving noncitizens lack constitutional rights 
does not follow from the plenary power doctrine). 
 38. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
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white witness.39 As it had done when it upheld federal power to exclude 
noncitizens, the Court found that, although the Constitution provides no 
enumerated deportation power, the power to expel resident noncitizens is 
inherent to sovereignty and might be exercised whenever the government 
felt removal was “necessary or expedient for the public interest.”40 Dis-
senting, Justice Brewer vigorously challenged the notion that a govern-
ment of enumerated powers possesses the power to expel resident noncit-
izens as incident to sovereignty: 
This doctrine of powers inherent in sovereignty is one both indefinite 
and dangerous. Where are the limits to such powers to be found, and 
by whom are they to be pronounced? . . . The governments of other 
nations have elastic powers. Ours are fixed and bounded by a written 
[C]onstitution. The expulsion of a race may be within the inherent 
powers of a despotism. History, before the adoption of this constitu-
tion, was not destitute of examples of the exercise of such a power; 
and its framers were familiar with history, and wisely . . . they gave 
to this government no general power to banish.41 
Additionally, the Court held that deportation was “not a punishment 
for a crime,” and therefore “the provisions of the [C]onstitution, securing 
the right of trial by jury, and prohibiting unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, and cruel and unusual punishments, have no application.”42 All 
three dissenting justices challenged this proposition.43 Justice Brewer 
responded: 
  
 39. Id. at 729. 
 40. Id. at 724. 
 41. Id. at 737; see also id. at 762 (Fuller, J., dissenting) (“Conceding that the exercise of the 
power to exclude is committed to the political department, and that the denial of entrance is not 
necessarily the subject of judicial cognizance, the exercise of the power to expel, the manner in 
which the right to remain may be terminated, rests on different ground, since limitations exist or are 
imposed upon the deprivation of that which has been lawfully acquired. And while the general 
government is invested, in respect of foreign countries and their subjects or citizens, with the powers 
necessary to the maintenance of its absolute independence and security throughout its entire territo-
ry, it cannot, in virtue of any delegated power, or power implied therefrom, of a supposed inherent 
sovereignty, arbitrarily deal with persons lawfully within the peace of its dominion.”). For echoes of 
Justice Brewer’s dissent in today’s discourse, see McElwee, supra note 28 (“[I]t’s time for progres-
sives to put forward a demand that deportation be taken not as the norm but rather as a disturbing 
indicator of authoritarianism.”). 
 42. Id. at 730. 
 43. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 744 (1893) (Brewer, J., dissenting); id. at 
749 (Field, J., dissenting) (“If the banishment of an alien from a country into which he has been 
invited as the asylum most auspicious to his happiness,-a country where he may have formed the 
most tender connections; where he may have invested his entire property, and acquired property of 
the real and permanent as well as the movable and temporary kind; where he enjoys, under the laws, 
a greater share of the blessings of personal security and personal liberty than he can elsewhere hope 
for; if a banishment of this sort be not a punishment, and among the severest of punishments, it 
would be difficult to imagine a doom to which the name can be applied.”); id. at 763 (Fuller, J., 
dissenting) (“As to them, registration for the purpose of identification is required, and the deporta-
tion denounced for failure to do so is by way of punishment to coerce compliance with that requisi-
tion. No euphuism can disguise the character of the act in this regard. It directs the performance of a 
judicial function in a particular way, and inflicts punishment without a judicial trial. It is, in effect, a 
legislative sentence of banishment, and, as such, absolutely void.”). 
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[I]t needs no citation of authorities to support the proposition that de-
portation is punishment. Every one knows that to be forcibly taken 
away from home and family and friends and business and property, 
and sent across the ocean to a distant land, is punishment, and that of-
tentimes most severe and cruel . . . And no person who has once 
come within the protection of the constitution can be punished with-
out a trial.”44 
Similarly, Chief Justice Fuller objected to the majority’s finding 
that the Court had no role to play in assessing the constitutionality of the 
law,45 insisting that deportation “inflicts punishment without a judicial 
trial”46 in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which are 
“universal in their application to all persons within the territorial jurisdic-
tion, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationali-
ty.”47  
Justice Field likewise “utterly dissent[ed],”48 expressing outrage at 
the majority’s willingness to leave whatever constitutional protections a 
noncitizen might hold to the whims of the political branches of govern-
ment: 
If a foreigner who resides in the country by its consent commits a 
public offense, is he subject to be cut down, maltreated, imprisoned, 
or put to death by violence, without accusation made, trial had, and 
judgment of an established tribunal, following the regular forms of 
judicial procedure? If any rule in the administration of justice is to be 
omitted or discarded in his case, what rule is it to be? If one rule may 
lawfully be laid aside in his case, another rule may also be laid aside, 
and all rules may be discarded. . . . That would be to establish a pure, 
simple, undisguised despotism and tyranny, with respect to foreigners 
resident in the country by its consent.49  
These dissents are, of course, far from perfect,50 and they each ap-
proach the majority opinion differently. Collectively, however, they raise 
a series of arguments that for many would be unthinkable today: denying 
that the federal government possesses the power to deport resident 
  
 44. Id. at 744 (Brewer, J., dissenting). 
 45. Id. at 761 (Fuller, J., dissenting) (“However reluctant courts may be to pass upon the 
constitutionality of legislative acts, it is of the very essence of judicial duty to do so, when the dis-
charge of that duty is properly invoked.”). 
 46. Id. at 763.  
 47. Id. at 761–62. 
 48. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 755 (1893). 
 49. Id. at 754. 
 50. For instance, the blatant racism of the Chinese Exclusion Cases is also present in the 
dissents. See, e.g., id. at 743 (1893) (Brewer, J., dissenting) (“It is true this statute is directed only 
against the obnoxious Chinese, but, if the power exists, who shall say it will not be exercised to-
morrow against other classes and other people?”). Note also that Justice Field authored the majority 
opinion in Chae Chan Ping v. United States, upholding the political branches’ unquestioned power 
to exclude “vast hordes” of Chinese migrants, who were “crowding in upon us.” 130 U.S. 581, 606 
(1889). 
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noncitizens, rejecting the limited role that the judiciary would play in 
assessing the constitutionality of certain immigration laws, insisting that 
deportation is a form of punishment, and urging that noncitizens facing 
deportation receive the same constitutional protections that criminal de-
fendants enjoy.  
Writing today, Justice Breyer’s wish list is in many respects more 
moderate. Unlike Justice Brewer, Justice Breyer does not challenge the 
federal government’s power to expel resident noncitizens, nor does he 
question whether a government of enumerated powers can possess other, 
ill-defined inherent powers. Nor does he urge that deportation or the de-
tention preceding it constitutes punishment and that the same constitu-
tional protections afforded criminal defendants should therefore attach. 
Rather, he merely suggests that the courts must play a role in assessing 
the constitutionality of immigration laws;51 that both noncitizens seeking 
admission and resident noncitizens in removal proceedings hold due pro-
cess rights;52 and that the Due Process Clause cannot tolerate indefinite 
civil detention without a periodic bond hearing.53 His dissent is thus in 
some respects a more moderate dissent than those in Fong Yue Ting. 
That Justice Breyer did not question the federal government’s power to 
deport is hardly surprising, of course, given that he could only address 
the questions before him in Jennings. Nonetheless, that his dissent is 
more moderate than Justice Brewer’s tells us something about the sorts 
of questions advocates deem worthy of asking in a world where deporta-
tion and detention are largely accepted as normal. 
CONCLUSION 
One hundred thirty years ago, some of our nation’s brightest legal 
minds were shocked by the notion that the federal government possessed 
the power to expel resident noncitizens at all. If the federal government 
did possess the power to banish, the notion that it could do so without 
providing the full protections given criminal defendants was also shock-
ing.  
  
 51. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 859 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Applying the 
avoidance doctrine assumes that courts have some role to play in testing the constitutionality of 
immigration laws. 
 52. Id. at 862–63. On this point, Justice Breyer does seem to ask more than did the dissenting 
justices in Fong Yue Ting, all of whom were concerned about federal power to expel resident noncit-
izens, not new arrivals. See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 733 (Brewer, J., dissenting); id. at 745 
(Field, J., dissenting); id. at 761 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting). 
 53. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 859. In this sense, Justice Breyer’s dissent asks for no greater 
judicial role in assessing the constitutionality of immigration laws than have prior decisions. See, 
e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001) (using constitutional avoidance to read an implicit 
reasonable time limitation into a statute otherwise allowing for indefinite detention after entry of a 
removal order). Further, the majority is not necessarily opposed to Justice Breyer on this point. 
Rather, it merely disagreed that the statutes might reasonably be interpreted as requiring periodic 
bond hearings. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 847–48. By leaving the constitutional question to the Ninth 
Circuit, the majority did not show its cards regarding how much deference it would provide Con-
gress in evaluating whether prolonged detention without a bond hearing is constitutional. 
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When Fong Yue Ting came out, the number of deportations carried 
out annually was negligible compared to today, and immigration deten-
tion was so little used that the Supreme Court had not yet addressed it.54 
Since then, a behemoth deportation and detention regime has arisen, and 
many unthinkingly accept that regime.55 According to the Department of 
Homeland Security, in 1893 the government removed 1,630 nonciti-
zens.56 In 2016, that number was 340,056.57 Likewise, the government 
rarely detained noncitizens until the 1990s,58 but since then immigration 
detention has become gargantuan, incarcerating hundreds of thousands of 
people every year.59  
Yet today, the Supreme Court justices most favorable toward the 
rights of noncitizens ask (unsuccessfully) only that a statute be construed 
such that certain noncitizens—those held in civil detention based on de-
cisions made by executive branch officials—receive a hearing every six 
months at which another executive branch official would assess whether 
incarceration remains necessary. It seems then that the range of rights 
once thought possible for noncitizens has narrowed. Might the time be 




 54. The Court would uphold temporary civil detention to effect deportation three years later in 
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